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IMMIGRATION LAW
LIMITATION ON EXEMPTIONS FROM DEPORTATION

Reid v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
Section 241(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act' exempts

from deportation any alien who is the spouse, parent, or child of a
United States citizen or permanent resident alien, and who, despite
his securing entry into this country by fraud or misrepresentation, was

"otherwise admissible at the time of entry."2 In Reid v. Immigration
and NaturalizationService,3 the Second Circuit, in an opinion authored

by Judge Mansfield 4 limited the scope of section 241(f) by holding it
inapplicable to aliens who procured entry by falsely representing themselves to be United States citizens. By so holding, the court refused to
adhere to the liberal, humanitarian approach to interpreting the
statute espoused by the Supreme Court and other courts of appeals.
The petitioners in Reid, a husband and wife who are natives and

citizens of British Honduras, entered the United States at the California-Mexico border by falsely representing themselves as United
States citizens.5 Subsequently, Mrs. Reid gave birth to two sons who

are native born citizens of this country. Two years after their illegal
entry, however, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
commenced deportation proceedings against the couple.6 Although
18 U.S.C. § 1251(t (1970).
2 Section 241(f) provides:
The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens within the
United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as
aliens who have sought to procure, or have procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation shall not
apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry who is the spouse,
parent, or a child of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence.
8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1970). An alien "means any person not a citizen or national of the
United States." Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)
(1970). If the Government seeks deportation on grounds other than fraudulent entry,
§ 241(f cannot be raised successfully by the alien. Castillo-Lopez v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 437 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1971); Tsaconas v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 397 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1968).
3492 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 39 (1974).
4 Judge Lumbard joined Judge Mansfield in the majority opinion.
5 Mr. and Mrs. Reid entered the United States on different dates, the former on
November 29, 1968 and the latter on January 3, 1969. 492 F.2d at 252.
6 The plenary power of Congress to deport was first recognized by the Supreme Court
in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). In Fong Yue Ting, the Court held
that deportation is a civil, not criminal, penalty. "The order of deportation is not a
punishment for crime. It is but a method of enforcing the return ... of an alien who
has not complied with the conditions upon the performance of which ... his continuing
to reside here shall depend." Id. at 730. See Note, Immigrants, Aliens, and the Constitu-
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conceding the INS charge that they had entered without complying
with appropriate procedures, 7 the Reids argued that deportation should
be stayed by the application of section 241(f) since they were now
parents of American citizens.8 However, the INS held that section 241(f)
was inapplicable and ordered deportation. 9 After their appeal was
dismissed by the Board of Immigration Appeals, the petitioners sought
and were granted review by the Second Circuit. 10
The Second Circuit, in affirming, rejected a literal reading of the
statute by which "one might conclude that as long as the alien was
'otherwise admissible' at the time of entry the species of fraud or nature
of the entry is immaterial.""' After analyzing the history and language
of section 241(f),12 Judge Mansfield reasoned that Congress did not
intend to let aliens circumvent "the essential substantive and procedural steps" of inspection. 1 Emphasizing that the statutory exemption
applies only when the fraud has been committed by one who gained
entry as an alien, he concluded that
[t]here is no evidence that Congress had in mind extending the
waiver of deportation to an attempt to by-pass completely this imtion, 49 NoRE DAME LAw. 1075, 1091-99 (1974), wherein the author sets forth the rights
of aliens subject to deportation, the power of Congress to deport, and the consequences

of deportation.
7 An alien must normally apply for a visa to enter the United States. After obtaining
approval for the visa, he must still be scrutinized and permitted admission by officials of
the INS at the point of entry. See C. GoRDoN & H. ROSFELD, IMMIGRAIION LAw AND

§§ 3.1-3.4 (rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as GORDON & ROsENFELD]. Section
235 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1970), provides in part:
All aliens arriving at ports of the United States shall be examined by one or more
immigration officers at the discretion of the Attorney General and under such
regulations as he may prescribe.
See also § 221 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1201 (1970), pertaining to the issuance of visas, and
§ 211(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1181(b), which concern the waiver of inspection for returning lawful residents.
8 492 F.2d at 252.
9 The INS sought to deport them under § 241(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)
(1970), as aliens who procured entry without the proper inspection. In pertinent part,
§ 241(a)(2) provides:
(a) Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall, upon the
order of the Attorney General, be deported who
PROCEDURE,

(2) entered the United States without inspection or at any time or place
other than as designated by the Attorney General or is in the United States in
violation of this chapter or in violation of any other law of the United States ....
10 The jurisdiction of the Second Circuit was predicated upon § 106 of the Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1970), which, by reference, adopts 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1970), thereby
placing exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of appeals to review final orders of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
'1492 F.2d at 253.
12 For a comprehensive examination of the legislative history of the section, see Note,
Immigration: The Criterion of "Otherwise Admissible" as a Basis for Relief from Deportation because of Fraud or Misrepresentation,66 CoLum. L. REv. 188 (1966). See also 34
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 351 (1965); 42 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 118 (1967).
1' 492 F.2d at 254.

1975]

SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1973 TERM

migration screening process and required "inspection" of aliens at
the border. 4
Accordingly, this statutory construction effectively frustrated the Reids
who were granted entry as "citizens," thereby avoiding the normal
alien inspection procedures. 15
The petitioners argued that the vital determination of their status
must focus upon the concept of "otherwise admissible." Applying this
theory, the Reids proposed that since, at the time of entry, they were
not excludable under section 212(a),'1 6 which delineates classes of aliens
excludable by law, they were "otherwise admissible," and thus eligible
for section 241 relief. Judge Mansfield countered this argument by
stressing the necessity for pre-entry examination and the difficulty of a
post hoc investigation after the fraud has terminated:
[A] mere review of the numerous grounds ... for excluding him
upon attempted entry persuades us that a post hoc investigation
would not be an adequate substitute for the exhaustive contemporaneous probe and examination required of the consular and INS
17
services.
The majority's position was sharply criticized in the thoughtful
dissent of Judge Mulligan.' His contentions centered principally upon
the proper interpretation of the purpose of section 241(f) as evidenced
by the language of the Supreme Court in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Errico.19 The Court therein resolved an existing conflict
between the Ninth Circuit's decision in Errico20 and the Second Circuit's holding in Scott v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.21
Furthermore, the Court was provided with its first opportunity to
interpret the phrase "otherwise admissible."
Both cases involved aliens who, through the use of fraud, procured
immigration visas and thus avoided immigration quota requirements. 22
14 Id. at 255.
15 See note 7 supra.
168 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1970). This section sets forth those classes of aliens excludable

from entry by law. The list includes those who have any dangerous, contagious disease,
mental defects, or a history of insanity. Also excludable are aliens who are drug addicts,
vagrants, draft evaders, anarchists, those convicted of certain crimes, paupers, professional

beggars and polygamists. The Reids were never accused of being within any of these
classes. For a general discussion of the exclusionary grounds, see Note, Immigrants, Aliens
and the Constitution, 49 NomRE DAME LAw. 1075, 1082-7 (1974).
17 492 F.2d at 257 (emphasis in original).
i1 Id. at 260.
'9 385 U.S. 214 (1966). For a general discussion of Errico, see 42 ST. JOHN'S L. R y. 118
(1967).
20 Errico v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 349 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1965).
21350 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1965).
22Errico, by claiming he was a specialized mechanic, was able to obtain a preferred

quota status. Deportation charges were initiated by the INS on the basis of his false
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As in Reid, children were subsequently born to both aliens, bringing
them within the purview of section 241(f). On appeal, the issue facing
both courts was whether section 241(f) should apply to those whose
fraud enabled them to evade "quantitative" restrictions,23 such as a
national quota, which would otherwise have been the basis for exclusion. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress had endeavored
through section 241(f) to help such aliens. The court felt that the
phrase "otherwise admissible" would be stripped of all "substantial
meaning and purpose" 24 if construed to make the 241(f) exemption
unavailable to aliens who failed to qualify for admission on a mere
quantitative ground. 25 The court found that such a construction would
aid the alien only if he had been independently admissible under a
separate status or quota, therefore making the fraud unnecessary. The
Second Circuit, however, held that "otherwise admissible" precluded
"all grounds of inadmissibility... including quantitative standards,"'2 6
reasoning that "[a]ny other interpretation is likely to invite frustration
and wholesale evasion of the quota system." 27 In so holding, the Scott
court rejected the petitioners' claim that "otherwise admissible" refers
only to qualitative grounds of admissibility. The court noted that its
interpretation would not strip section 241(f) of its significance for it
would still operate to save those aliens who would have been admissible
28
initially whether or not they had perpetrated the fraud.
representation. Section 211(a)(4) of the Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 181 (1952), repealed, 79 Stat.
917 (1965), required that, to be admissable, an immigrant had to be "of the proper status
under the quota specified in the immigrant visa."
In Scott, the alien, on the basis of a sham marriage to an American citizen in
Jamaica, obtained a nonquota immigrant visa. Deportation proceedings were brought on
the basis of § 211(a)(3) of the Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 181 (1952), repealed, 79 Stat. 917
(1965), which required that an alien be "a nonquota immigrant if specified as such in the
immigrant visa" to be admissible. For a discussion of sham marriages and the family
unity doctrine, see Comment, Family Unity Doctrinev. Sham MarriageDoctrine, I CALIF.
W. INTL' L.J. 80 (1970).
23The difference between quantitative and qualitative standards has been explained
as follows:
Quantitative restrictions in the immigration laws serve to limit the number of
immigrants (e.g., quota restrictions) while qualitative restrictions are intended to
exclude those who are mentally, morally or physically unfit or undesirable.
Lee Fook Chuey v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 439 F.2d 244, 246 (9th Cir.
1970). Qualitative grounds are generally specified in § 212 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)
(1970). See note 16 supra.
24 349 F.2d at 546.
25 Id.
26 350 F.2d at 283.
27 Id.
28 Id. The court continued:

If "otherwise admissible" is limited to prevent invocation of the relief provision
only by the insane, prostitutes, Commumst Party members, and other qualitatively
proscribed persons, the door will be opened for individuals from countries with
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The Supreme Court, in affirming Errico and reversing Scott, construed "otherwise admissible" by analyzing the legislative history of
section 241(f) and its predecessors. The Court concluded:
Congress felt that, in many circumstances, it was more important
to unite families and preserve family ties than it was to enforce
strictly the quota limitations or even the many restrictive sections
that are designed to keep undesirable or harmful aliens out of the
country. 29
In light of this humanitarian intention, the Court applied a liberal
construction to section 241(f), holding that the circumvention of a
quota restriction should not prevent an alien from qualifying as "otherwise admissible" at the time of entry.
In Reid, Judge Mansfield attempted to distinguish the factual circumstances of Errico. He observed that the aliens in Errico had submitted to the immigration visa issuance process and had not totally
avoided inspection. Consequently, Judge Mansfield argued:
[he issue in Errico- whether a quota fraud (as distinguished
from a fraud with respect to qualitative admissibility) precludes
an alien from being "otherwise admissible" - was a limited one.
The suggestion that the Supreme Court implied that § 241(f) might
be available to deprive the consular service and INS of any opportunity to screen entering aliens reads too much into Errico.30
To the contrary, Judge Mulligan stressed the humanitarian considerations in the Errico decision. He reasoned that the Errico Court
had rejected a literal interpretation of section 241(f) "because it would
thwart the humanitarian purposes of the statute."3 1 Accordingly, the
dissent emphasized that a literal reading of the statute would not only
support the petitioners' contention but would be consistent with the
humanitarian intentions of the legislation. 2 Judge Mulligan further
low but oversubscribed quotas easily to circumvent and thwart this country's
immigration policy.
Id. The court believed that aliens could be saved from deportation for fraud itself, "but
not for the underlying offense." Id. at 284.
20 385 U.S. at 220. The Court further elaborated:
It was wholly consistent for Congress to provide that immigrants who gained
admission by misrepresentation, perhaps many years ago, should not be deported
because their countries' quotas were oversubscribed when they entered if the
effect of deportation would be to separate families composed in part of American
citizens or lawful permanent residents.
Id. at 224-5. See also note 12 supra.
30 492 F.2d at 258.
sl Id. at 262.
32 Id. Judge Mulligan reminded the majority that
[t]he statute is not limited to fraudulent visa-bearers but in so many words applies
to those persons who have "procured visas or other documentation, or entry into
the United States by fraud or misrepresentation."
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pointed out that the Supreme Court instructed that any question as to
the proper construction of a deportation statute "should be resolved in
favor of the alien,"33 since deportation is often "the equivalent of
banishment or exile." 84 He thus believed that any ambiguity in the
statute must be construed in favor of the Reids 5 Addressing the
majority's concern as to possible frustration of the screening process,
Judge Mulligan suggested that a tightening of security would be a
better solution than the "mutilation of Section 241(f)."88
Judge Mulligan's position is supported by recent decisions in
other circuits. In Lee Fook Chuey v. Immigration and 'Naturalization
Service,37 the Ninth Circuit, stressing the humanitarian approach of
Errico, held the section 241 exemption applicable to an alien who had
gained entry by making a false claim of citizenship.38 Not surprisingly,
the Reid majority cited the Lee case with disapproval, believing the
procedural system designed to enforce the immigration laws to be of
paramount importance.3 9
Shortly after Reid, the Fifth Circuit in Gonzalez de Moreno v.
Immigration and NaturalizationService,40 confronted the same issue
Id. at 260-61 (emphasis in original). His position is further supported by the definition
of "entry" in § 101(a)(13) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. "The term 'entry'

means any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1970) (emphasis added). A distinction
an outlying possession .....
is not drawn between an alien, such as Mr. or Mrs. Reid, and a "visa-bearing" alien, such
as Errico.
83492 F.2d at 261, quoting Immigration and Nationalization Service v. Errico, 385
U.S. 214, 225 (1966).
84 Id. The Errico Court had referred to its language in Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,
333 U.S. 6 (1948), wherein it was stated:
We resolve the doubts in favor of that construction because deportation is a
drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile.... To construe this statutory provision less generously ... might find support in logic. But
since the stakes are considerable ... we will not assume that Congress meant to
trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several
possible meanings of the words used.

Id. at 10 (emphasis added). See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) ("[Deportation] visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and
live and work in this land of freedom').
85 492 F.2d at 262.
86Id. at 263. Judge Mulligan observed that INS officials are "not helpless" in the
face of a false claim of citizenship by anyone entering the country, for inspection can
easily take place. Id. at 264. His concern is that the "blunder of the constable" in not
suspecting an alien will unjustly culminate in the deportation of the Reids. Id.
37439 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1970). Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, falsely
claimed United States citizenship and as a consequence was admitted into this country.
He subsequently married and became a father. Id. at 245.
8 Id. at 248. The court also felt that the purpose of the phrase "otherwise admissible" was to guarantee that those aliens eligible for entry are physically, mentally and
morally fit. The court noted that a post hoc investigation of the alien would still
allow the government to determine his qualitative admissibility. Id.
39 492 F.2d at 258-59.
40492 F2d 532 (5th Cir. 1974).
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in a similar fact situation. 41 Once again, the Government claimed that
4
section 241(f) applies only if the alien has submitted to an inspection.
Nevertheless, the court, after noting the Second Circuit's agreement
with the Government's view, found that
[t]he interpretation proferred [sic] by the Government is not only
it is
contrary to the plain meaning of the words used by Congress,
43
also without support in the legislative history of the statute.
Interpreting Erricoin precisely the same manner as had Judge Mulligan
in Reid, the court remarked that "[w]e have no warrant under Errico
to apply bizarre techniques of interpretation to restrict the scope of
§ 241(f)." 4 In so deciding, the Fifth Circuit was particularly concerned
with the inequities of discriminating between aliens who misrepresent
themselves at the immigration screening and those who take "the small
additional step of entirely avoiding the procedure by asserting American
citizenship." 48 It failed to see a distinction between a worthless investigation and no investigation at all.46 The court shared Judge Mulligan's
view that if section 241(f) is to have substance it must be construed as
necessitating only that an alien satisfy "the physical, mental and moral
47
standards" for entry.
Those cases which have denied section 241(f) relief are clearly
distinguishable from the factual situations in Lee, Moreno, and Reid.
The majority of these decisions deal with the evasion of qualitative
standards for entry and stand for the proposition that a mere claim of
misrepresentation or fraud will not aid aliens who are not "otherwise
admissible" on qualitative grounds. 48 Other cases have held section
41 By misrepresenting herself as a citizen, the petitioner, whose husband and five
children were American citizens, procured entry from Mexico. Id. at 535.
42 Id. at 536. See note 7 supra.
43 Id. The court noted, in particular, the exacting manner in which the section
"provides relief for those who obtain 'visas or other documentation or entry' by means
of fraud or misrepresentation." Id. See note 2 supra.
44Id. at 537. The court stressed that § 241(f) is a "benevolent statute. Mercy and
Id. at 538.
compassion are inherent in its ameliorative function .
45 Id. at 537.
46 Id.

47 Id. at 538.
48 These cases involve the concealment of a wide spectrum of disqualifying offenses.

See, e.g., Hames-Herrera v. Rosenberg, 463 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1972) (criminal convictions);
Jolley v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 946 (1971) (draft evasion); de Vargas v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
409 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 895 (1969) (re-entering the United
States without permission following deportation); Loos v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 407 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 877 (1969) (military service relief);
Velasquez Espinosa v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 404 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1968)
(draft evasion); Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir.
1966), aff'd, 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (homosexuality); Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642
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241(f) unavailable to aliens who enter the country surreptitiously,
thereby avoiding any contact with Immigration officials.4 9 In the
remainder of the cases, the fraud issue was not the primary concern of
the courts and the decisions were premised on other grounds. 50
Section 241(f), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Errico, is
(Ist Cir. 1961) (Communist Party membership); Ablett v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 625 (D.C.
Cir. 1957) (conviction for brothel operation); United States v. Flores Rodriguez, 237 F.2d
405 (2d Cir. 1956) (criminal conviction); Jankowski v. Shaughnessy, 186 F.2d 580 (2d Cir.
1951) (criminal record); Daskaloff v. Zurbrick, 103 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1939) (prior deportation).
49See Monarrez-Monarrez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 472 F.2d 119
(9th Cir. 1972). The court therein stated:
Fraud and misrepresentation cannot be equated to surreptitious entry without
bending the language of sections 241(a)(2) and 241(f) into shapelessness and without ignoring the history of section 241(f) recited in Errico.
472 F.2d at 120. See also Gambino v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 419 F.2d 1355
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970) (stowaway).
5o See, e.g., Haghoosh Baronakian Pirzadian v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 472 F-2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1973); Ferrante v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 399
F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1968); Tsaconas v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 397 F.2d 946
(7th Cir. 1968); Ntovas v. Ahrens, 276 F.2d 483 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 826 (1960).
In Ntovas, the court remarked:
In the administrative proceedings the ground selected and relied upon by the
government was not fraud or misrepresentation and plaintiff has not the power
to substitute for his own convenience a ground not involved in the deportation
proceedings. Whether or not he subjectively harbored an intent to commit fraud
is a matter between him and his conscience.
276 F.2d at 484. See also Milande v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 484 F.2d
774, 776 (7th Cir. 1973); Cabuco-Flores v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 477
F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1973) (deciding the issue on overstay, not fraud, grounds). But see
Vitalis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 443 F.2d 343, 344 (9th Cir. 1971),
vacated, 405 U.S. 983 (1972), holding that a person being deported for overstaying a
visitor's visa may rely on section 241(f). Petitioner claimed she secured the visa by fraud.
The case was remanded for determination of this issue and a resolution of whether she
was otherwise admissible.
Of similar import is Bufalino v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 473 F.2d
728 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973). Judge Mansfield cited this decision to support the proposition that an alien who has entered the country by a claim of false dtizenship is not eligible for § 241(f) relief. 492 F.2d at 259. However, this conclusion is
questionable. The primary consideration in deporting Bufalino was his violation of § 265
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1305, requiring an alien to file address reports each year. 473 F.2d
at 730-31. Bufalino had been held ineligible for § 241(f) relief because of a fraudulent
claim of citizenship in Bufalino v. Holland, 277 F.2d 270 (Sd Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
863 (1960). thirteen years earlier. Significantly, this was prior to the Errico decision. In
the later Bufalino case, cited by Judge Mansfield, the court skirted the issue of the effect
of a false claim of citizenship on the applicability of § 24 1(f). As noted in the concurring
opinion of Judge Adams:
INS v. Errico . . . sheds new light upon § 1251(f) which forgives illegal entries
for aliens with close family ties where they are otherwise admissible at the time
of entry. Because Bufalino is properly deportable for having failed to file address
reports, it is unnecessary to determine whether, in view of ... Errico, the Board
abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the earlier deportation proceedings
in which the petitioner was held deportable on other grounds ....

473 F.2d at 739 n.4.
Section 241(f) has also been held inapplicable where the fraud by the alien occurred
after entry. Khadjenouri v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 460 F.2d 461 (9th
Cir. 1972) (the fraud related to an adjustment of status).
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an important vehicle in exigent circumstances for granting relief from
the strictures of our national quota policies. As indicated by the dissent
in Reid, the consequences of deportation for those in the Reids' situation are grave.5 ' Thus, a post hoc investigation, as advanced by Judge
Mulligan, 52 would appear a viable alternative to satisfy the humanitarian purposes of section 241(f). Hopefully, the Supreme Court will
adopt the position of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits and extend the
statutory relief to those in the Reids' position*
Sanders L. Kurtz
51492 F.2d at 264. The remarks of Mr. Reid at the deportation hearing, as quoted
in Judge Mulligan's dissent, poignantly describe the dilemma of the family:
We have plenty reason why we shouldn't be deported. For one we have kids and
if we are deported we ain't got no home to go back to. Everything we had was
abandoned. Taking two kids back there like sending two kids to die from malnutrition.
Id. at 265.
52 Id. at 264.
Editor's Note. While this article was being printed, the Supreme Court affirmed
the Second Circuit's decision. 43 U.S.L.W. 4387 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1975). The Court, per Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, held that § 241(f) does not aid an alien who has entered the country
without inspection, and that entry through a false claim of American citizenship is entry
without inspection. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, finding no significant distinction between the instant case and the Court's prior decision in Errico.

